Research
Framed and Framing Inquiry
Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
My long-term research goal is to develop a new direction for epistemology, and pragmatist epistemology in particular. I argue that we should distinguish between two ways of creating knowledge, or two kinds of inquiry. Framed inquiries take for granted a conceptual framework in order to ask and answer questions (for example, biochemists studying the effects of temperature on protein synthesis). Framing inquiries deal with problems that require the creation, revision, or expansion of conceptual frameworks (for example, William Thomson’s construction of a theoretical framework based on the notion of absolute temperature). While epistemology has largely focused on framed knowledge, the latter rests on greater epistemic achivements: the development of fruitful conceptual frameworks that make the world intelligible, allow us to talk about things, and open up new possibilities for asking and answering questions.
Framed and framing inquiry: a pragmatist proposal (Synthese, 2023)
In this article, I formulate and defend the distinction against its collapse by representationalists (e.g. Sider) and anti-representationalists (e.g. Quine, Rorty). While the former take all inquiries to be in the business of discovering mind-independent facts, the latter take all inquiries to be governed by pragmatic considerations. Against the objections raised by both camps, I defend a pragmatist and substantive distinction between framed and framing inquiry, inspired by Carnap’s distinction between internal and external questions and reformulated in terms of Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Click here to read it.
Why pragmatist and realists can both be right about truth (manuscript under review)
In this article, I argue that there are two distinct norms of truth that regulate our conversational and epistemic practices, depending on whether we are making and evaluating claims in a framed situation or inquiry (‘Is it true that women are underrepresented in STEM subjects?’) or in a framing situation or inquiry (‘Is it true that trans women are women?’). In the first case, the primary norm of truth is realist, and can be construed in terms of correct semantic assertibility. In the second case, the primary norm of truth is pragmatist, and can be construed in terms of overall pragmatic coherence or instrumental value. As long as their accounts are not generalized across the board, both realists and pragmatists can be right about truth. Email me for a copy.
Framed and framing inquiry: Development and defence of John Dewey's theory of knowledge (PhD thesis, 2022)
In my PhD dissertation (Cambridge, 2022), I provide a novel perspective on what realists consider to be Dewey’s most controversial claims regarding knowledge, its object, and truth. I defend Dewey’s theory of inquiry by drawing a distinction between framed and framing inquiry. I argue that Dewey’s most original (and controversial) insights should be understood in the context of framing inquiry, while traditional realist notions of knowledge, existence, and truth should be understood in the context of framed inquiry. Click here to request access.
Conceptual Engineering
Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Metaphilosophy
My current postdoctoral project, under the supervision of Cheryl Misak, consists in developing a comprehensive pragmatist framework for conceptual engineering, which will serve as an alternative to existing frameworks. It involves an account of what is engineered, based on classical and contemporary pragmatist accounts of meanings and concepts; an account of how we engineer, based on John Dewey’s theory of inquiry and my own account of “framing inquiry”; and the use of this pragmatist framework in order to solve several problems in the field. This project is directly connected to my long-term research goal of developing a pragmatist epistemology centred around framing inquiry.
The Practical Implementation Challenge (Brill, forth.)
In this paper, I argue against what I call the “transubstantiation version” of the implementation challenge offered by Max Deutsch (2020, 2021), showing that it only holds for representationalist approaches to conceptual engineering. Nevertheless, Deutsch still deserves a response from the pragmatist, since he also raises a more general challenge that I dub the “practical implementation challenge”. I offer a pragmatist solution, drawing on John Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Robert Brandom’s inferentialism. This solution includes recommendations distributed across all stages of the engineering process, in privileging projects that are (1) problem-driven, (2) bottom-up; ensuring that the proposal is (3) clearly justified, (4) maintains continuity with the existing inferential role; and finally, in (5) enforcing the novel concept in practices of deontic scorekeeping, (6) backed up by institutional or intellectual authority. Email me for a copy.
Conceptual indeterminacy and conceptual disagreement
Philosophy of Language, (Social) Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
One of my future projects consist in studying various kinds of "conceptual indeterminacy", including open texture and essentially contested concepts, the conceptual disagreements they engender, and the role of argumentation in their articulation and resolution.
Open texture and inferentialism
I plan to write an article developing an inferentialist account of open texture, based on Robert Brandom's inferentialism.
Planet as an open texture concept (with Janna Müller)
With Janna Müller (HPS, University of Cambridge), we plan to co-write a paper on the evolution of PLANET as an open texture concept, focusing on the 19th century. After the discovery of four new celestial bodies between 1801 and 1807 (Ceres, Pallas, Juno, Vesta), debates emerged regarding the correct definition of "planet" and whether the concept should be applied to these new bodies. We analyse these debates through the lens of the notion of "open texture", arguing that this is a case where the concept was confronted with objects lying beyond its standard range of application.
The role of argumentation in conceptual disagreements
I plan to draw on social epistemology (including the epistemology of deep disagreement) as well as inferentialism (Brandom's "game of giving and asking for reasons") to study the role of argumentation in situations of conceptual indeterminacy. I will study the role of argumentation in the articulation and negotiation of conceptual content, the role of adversarial and cooperative elements in argumentation, and dichotomy between practical and theoretical reasons.
Empirical philosophy of science
With Hannah Tomczyk and Christopher Sperber, I conducted an empirical study of physicists' intuitions regarding scientific realism. The goal was to see if physicists share philosophers' intuitions when it comes to the question of the truth of scientific theories, the existence of particles such as electron or phonons, and if there is any correlation between their beliefs and their field, approach (theoretical or experimental), or career stage. The article presenting and discussing our findings is forthcoming in the European Journal for Philosophy of science. Click here for the pre-print.
Pragmatism and John Dewey
History of philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Ethics
Much of my research explores themes and ideas from the classical pragmatists, in particular John Dewey. This part of my work is both exegetical and reconstructive, and ranges from the philosophy of knowledge broadly understood (Dewey's instrumentalist theory of inquiry, his views on the object of knowledge, representation, and truth), to ethics (Dewey's theory of moral judgment, in connection with British sentimentalism).
John Dewey: Was the inventor of instrumentalism himself an instrumentalist? (HOPOS, 2023)
In this article, I present the key aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalism and contrast his views with the better-known instrumentalism of Mach, Duhem, and Poincaré. Dewey’s epistemological instrumentalism is global and not local; nevertheless, it is fallibilist and optimistic rather than skeptical and pessimistic. Dewey’s ontological instrumentalism concerns the nature of scientific objects, regardless of whether they are observable or unobservable, and is fully compatible with realism about atoms or electrons. Dewey’s practical instrumentalism holds that because science provides understanding of the workings of nature rather than an exhaustive picture of reality, it is the best instrument we have for the enrichment of experience. HOPOS | Pre-print
The interplay between emotion and reason: the role of empathy in moral judgment (Routledge, 2020)
This chapter examines Dewey’s view of moral knowledge developed in Chapter 14 of the Ethics (1932). I focus more specifically on the role played by sympathy in moral inquiry. I emphasize the originality of Dewey’s position by contrasting it with that of David Hume, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill, who all stressed the fundamental role of sympathy in making moral judgments. I examine their respective answers to the moral problem raised by natural sympathy: how can such a biased and partial psychological mechanism play a beneficial role in the formation of moral judgments, which specifically aim at impartiality and objectivity? Taylor & Francis.
In the future
I plan to write articles on Dewey's theory of truth, his non-representationalism, his naturalism, the relation between Dewey’s logic and other pragmatist figures of his time (Ramsey, C. I. Lewis, Sellars), with a particular focus on general propositions and inferential rules.
Book reviews
I have reviewed various books in pragmatist scholarship: Hilary Putnam, Philosophy as Dialogue (Harvard University Press, 2022), in International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming); John J. Stuhr, No Professor's Lectures Can Save Us: William James's Pragmatism, Radical Empiricism, and Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2022), in Metascience (forthcoming); Roberto Gronda, Dewey’s Philosophy of Science" (Springer, 2020), in Philosophy of Science (2021); Steven Levine, Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2019), in European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (2019); Joëlle Zask, La Démocratie aux Champs (La Découverte, 2016), in European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy (2018).